Abstract. In the theory of Markov decision processes (MDPs), a Blackwell optimal policy is a policy that is optimal for every discount factor sufficiently close to one. This paper provides an axiomatic basis for Blackwell optimality in discrete-time MDPs with finitely many states and finitely many actions.
Introduction
In his foundational paper, Blackwell [4] showed that for any discrete-time Markov decision process (MDP) with finitely many states and finitely many actions, there exists a stationary policy that is optimal for every discount factor sufficiently close to one. Following Veinott [15] , policies that possess this property are now referred to as Blackwell optimal. Blackwell optimality and the related concept of 1-optimality (also known as near optimality, 0-discount optimality, and bias optimality) have come to provide two of the most well studied optimality criteria for undiscounted MPDs (see, e.g., [10, 9, 13, 12, 14, 6, 7] ). However, the question of which assumptions on a decision maker's preferences lead to these criteria has not been answered in the literature.
To address this question, we consider a decision maker with preferences over U = {u = (u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , . . . ) ∈ R N : sup t∈N |u t | < +∞}. The preference relation is postulated to be reflexive and transitive, where u v means that u is at least as good as v, u ≻ v means that u is better than v (u v but not v u), and u ∼ v means that u and v are equally good (u v and v u). A policy generates a stream u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . ) ∈ U of expected rewards (see Eq. (3) below), where u t is the expected reward at time t, t ∈ N. Let U stat denote the set of streams generated by stationary policies, that is, policies for which the action chosen at time t depends only on the state at time t. The principal result of this paper (Theorem 1) provides conditions on that ensure that and B coincide on U stat , where
is the preference relation induced by the 1-optimality criterion. To state this result, we use the following notation: For u, v ∈ U and c ∈ R, we let (c, u) denote (c, u 1 , u 2 , u 3 , . . . ). If u t ≥ v t for all t ∈ N and u t > v t for some t ∈ N, we write u > v. The long-run average
of u is denoted byū if the limit (2) exists. 
A3. For all u ∈ U , ifū is well defined, then (ū, u) ∼ u.
Then and B coincide on U stat .
This result is proved in [8] on a different domain (the set of streams that are either summable or eventually periodic). To prove Theorem 1, we extend the result from [8] to a larger domain (Lemma 2) and show that this domain contains U stat (Lemma 3).
The first two assumptions in Theorem 1, A1 and A2, are standard (cf. [2, 3] ). To interpret A3, which is the Compensation Principle from [8] , imagine that the decision maker is faced with two different scenarios: In the first scenario, a stream of rewards u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . .) ∈ U is received. In the second scenario, there is a one-period postponement of u, for which a compensation of c is received in the first period. According to A3, the decision maker is indifferent between u and (c, u) if c =ū. For an axiomatic defence of this assertion, see [8, Prop. 1] .
Theorem 1 tells us that if a decision maker restricts attention to stationary policies and respects A1, A2, and A3, then any stationary 1-optimal policy is (weakly) best possible with respect to his or her preferences. (The same conclusion hold for Blackwell optimal policies since such policies are 1-optimal by definition.) While restricting attention to stationary policies is often natural, it is well known that not all optimality criteria admit stationary optimal policies [5, 13, 11] . The arguments used in the proof of Theorem 1 apply to sequences u ∈ U that are asymptotically periodic (see Eq. (8) below). We mention without proof that as a consequence, the conclusion in Theorem 1 holds also on the set of streams generated by eventually periodic policies.
Definitions
We use Blackwell's [4] formulation of a discrete-time MDP, with S = {1, 2, . . . , S} a finite set of states, A a finite set of actions, and F the set of all functions f : S → A. Thus at each time t, t ∈ N, a system is observed to be in one of S states, an action is chosen from A, and a reward is received. The reward is assumed to be a function from A × S to R. The transition probability matrix and reward (column) vector that correspond to f ∈ F are denoted by Q(f ) and R(f ), respectively. So, if the system is observed to be in state s and action f (s) is chosen, then a reward of [R(f )] s is received and the system moves to s ′ with probability [Q(f )] s,s ′ . A policy is a sequence π = (f 1 , f 2 , f 3 . . . ), each f t ∈ F . The set of all policies is denoted by Π. A policy π = (f 1 , f 2 , f 3 . . . ) is stationary if f t = f 1 for all t ∈ N, and eventually periodic if there exist p, T ∈ N such that f t = f t+p for all t ≥ T .
The stream of expected rewards that π = (f 1 , f 2 , . . . ) generates, given an initial state s ∈ S, is the sequence u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . ) defined (see [4, p. 719] )
We define U stat as the set of all u ∈ U that can be written (3) for some stationary π ∈ Π and some s ∈ S, where (S, A, F, {Q(f )} f ∈F , {R(f )} f ∈F ) is a MDP with finitely many states and finitely many actions.
Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 will be completed through three lemmas. The first lemma shows that if satisfies A1-A3, then and B coincide on the set of pairs u, v ∈ U for which the series ∞ t=1 (u t − v t ) is Cesàro-summable and has bounded partial sums, where
is the preference relation induced by Veinott's [15] average overtaking criterion. All results presented in this paper hold with V in the role of B . That the conclusion in Lemma 1(b) holds with B in the role of V follows from that B satisfies A1-A3. The rest of the proof consists of identifying a superset of U stat to which the conclusion in Lemma 1(b) extends. Lemma 2 shows that this conclusion holds on the set of u ∈ U that can be written
where w is eventually periodic and the series ∞ t=1 △ t is Cesàro-summable (the limit lim n→∞ 1 n n T =1 T t=1 △ t exists and is finite) and has bounded partial sums. Let U + denote the set of streams that can be written in this way.
Lemma 2.
A preference relation on U that satisfies A1-A3 is complete on U + and coincides with B on this domain.
That is complete on U + means that for all u, v ∈ U + , if u v does not hold, then v ≻ u.
Proof. Let be a preference relation that satisfies A1-A3, and let u, v ∈ U + . Then d := u − v ∈ U + . We show that u v if and only if u B v. Take w, △ ∈ U , λ > 0 and p, T ∈ N such that d = w + △, where w t+p = w t for all t ≥ T and where ∞ t=1 △ t is Cesàro-summable with bounded partial sums. Without loss of generality, we may assume that p ≥ 2. Case 1:
T +p t=T w t = 0. Then ∞ t=1 w t is Cesàro-summable and has bounded partial sums. This means that (ii) x t ≥ 0 for all t ∈ N and x t = 0 for all t < T * . It remains to verify that U + contains U stat . For this it is sufficient to show that every u ∈ U stat can be written
where w is eventually periodic and △ t goes to zero at exponential rate as t → ∞. We say that u ∈ U is asymptotically periodic if u can be written in this way.
Lemma 3. If u ∈ U is generated by a stationary policy, then u is asymptotically periodic.
Proof. Let u ∈ U stat be generated by applying π = (f, f, f, . . . ) given an initial state s ∈ S, so that u t is the s:th component of (here Q(f ) 0 is the identity matrix)
We need to show that there exist w, △ ∈ U and λ > 0 with
where w is eventually periodic and lim t→∞ e λt △ t = 0. A well known corollary of the Perron-Frobenius theorem for nonnegative matrices says that for any S × S stochastic matrix P and x ∈ R S , the sequence P t · x, t ∈ N, converges exponentially to a periodic orbit (see, e.g., [1] .) That is, there exist ρ > 0, p ∈ N, T ∈ N, and y(t) ∈ R S , t ∈ N, such that y(t + p) = y(t) for all t ≥ T and where lim t→∞ |(P t · x − y(t)) s |e ρt = 0 for every s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , S}. Thus we can take λ > 0, p ∈ N, T ∈ N, and w(t) ∈ R S , e(t) ∈ R S , t ∈ N, such that (Q(f )) t−1 · R(f ) = w(t) + e(t)
for every t, where w(t + p) = w(t) for all t ≥ T and where each component of e(t) goes to zero faster than e −λt . If we now set w t = [w(t)] s , △ t = [e(t)] s , t ∈ N, then u = w + △, where w is eventually periodic and lim t→∞ e λt △ t = 0.
